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PRINICIPLES AND PARADOXES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Delivered at a Conference on the Dialogue of Cultures, Center for Ethics and Culture, 
Notre Dame, December 2007) 
On paper, contemporary international law forms an impressive corpus.   States 
habitually invoke the law of nations against one another even as they themselves violate 
its requirements.1  Citizens criticizing their own state’s policies often invoke international 
law.   The law of nations even includes a doctrine of jus cogens, sometimes held to be 
superior even to the United Nations Charter, according to which treaties and diplomatic 
practices can be held ‘unconstitutional.’ 2  In practice, however, the international 
community’s lack both of an enforcement authority and of a stable customary morality 
renders international law erratic at best.  (I do not here distinguish communities and 
societies – no one holds that the international community or the United States is a 
community in the way a well-functioning family is.) 
Two issues arise, one conceptual and one normative, linked by the fact that law is 
a ‘pro-word’; in less positivistic terms, it carries authority.  
1. Is international law, insofar it purports to control the behavior of States, 
law?  
2. Why should we care about what a skeptic is likely to call ‘legal niceties’ 
when they interfere with our collective purposes?  
 
 
AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Condolezza Rice, now Secretary of State, wrote in 2000,  “foreign policy in a 
Republican Administration … will  … proceed from the firm ground of the national 
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interest, not from the interest of an illusory international community.” 3    And, going 
beyond traditional ‘realists’ such as Hans Morgenthau,4 she added,   “American values 
are universal; people want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those 
who govern them; the triumph of these values is assuredly easier when the balance of 
power favors those who believe in them.” 5   The same arguments could have been made 
on behalf of the Athenians at Melos.  
Rice’s views are inconsistent with the presuppositions of international law, which 
requires a society, whose law it is.  All forms of human society are imagined (which is 
not to say, imaginary) communities, and the human race as a whole is no worse off in this 
respect that the United States.   And if there is an international community, the maxim, 
ubi societas, ibi jus, guarantees the existence of some sort of law.   For we are creatures 
who need to work out the rules of our association, and who spontaneously recognize one 
another as potential friends as well as potential enemies.  . 
The interdependence and internal fragmentation of states undermine the 
assumption that states are the only significant actors in world politics, each guided by 
something coherent called the ‘national interest.’ 6   But such globalizing trends run 
parallel with the increasing difficulty in securing the co-operation our situation requires, 
both among and within nation-states.  In a baffling world, the greater ease of dealing only 
with one’s own kind makes xenophobia perpetually attractive.7  
Even if the international community lacks a common good, it has a common bad.  
International law rests on a doomsday scenario:  the destruction of civilization through 
uncontrolled conflict.  The current version is breakdown into an array of armed bands 
struggling for diminishing resources to meet to their increasing needs, stoking their 
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mutual hostilityy with atavistic myths; and, sooner or later, employing weapons of mass 
destruction.  All (or nearly all) international actors have an interest in avoiding such 
results.  Hence international actors have built a ‘morality of accommodation,’ to make it 
possible for peoples to live together. 8    Nearly all such actors, including the United 
States, sometimes exempt themselves from the resulting standards and take a free ride on 
the observance of others. 
 
PARADOXES 
Both the international morality of the accommodation and the law it supports are 
subject to a number of debilitating paradoxes. 
 
Human Rights 
The concept of crimes against humanity has formed the foundation of a new 
departure in international law.  The first prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal, Antonio 
Cassese, points out, “in the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’, `humanity’ did not mean 
‘mankind’ or ‘human race’ but the ‘quality’ or ‘concept’ of man.”9    British jurist 
Geoffrey Robertson gives a different explanation:  such crimes “were committed against 
humanity in general because the very fact a person can order them diminishes the human 
race.”10  Both formulations imply all human beings have an interest in maintaining our 
shared status, whether infringed in the victim or the perpetrator, and this shared interest 
creates the rudiments of a human, and hence also of an international, community.  Thus 
Lung Chu-Chen, a Taiwanese international lawyer now teaching in the United States, has 
said, “the individual… acting both alone and as a group representative, is the ultimate 
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participant [in international law], performing in functions relevant to making and 
applying law.”11    
Every significant political actor now pays lip service to the notion of universal 
human rights.   But violation of even the most elementary rights is now a daily 
occurrence.    And there is no agreement upon either the reason we have such rights or 
the principles for resolving disputes about their content.   Unusually for an international 
document, the American Convention on Human Rights (or Pact of San José) (1978), like 
many such documents is singed but not ratified by the United States,  attempts to answer 
the fundamental question.  “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every 
human being” (Art. 1 § 2).  It further specifies, “the right [to life] shall be protected by 
law and, in general, from the moment of conception” (Art. 4 § 1).   We need not inquire 
further why this document has been neglected. 
But the emphasis on human rights stands in stark contrast with the working 
assumptions of diplomatic practice, which only tentatively recognizes non-State actors as 
participants, and even then prefers potential States such as peoples demanding self-
determination.  Even more radical innovations, such as the rights asserted on behalf of 
indigenous peoples and the claims made on transnational corporations, prefer fictional to 
real persons.  When international law speaks the language of human rights, moreover, it 
is oriented toward the control of ethnic, i.e., group, conflicts.  Torture, for example, is 
defined in international law as the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering, 
whether physical or mental, by or with the consent of a public official – in other words, as 
an offense against political outsiders rather than as a manifestation of individual 
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depravity. 12   Rape likewise is treated as an assault by one ethnic group on another 
through its women members – in other words political rather than a sexual offense. 13 
 
International Economic Justice 
Michael Walzer points out that in a decentralized international regime, “the forces 
that oppose equality will never have to face the massed power of the globally 
dispossessed, for there won’t be one global arena where this power can be massed.”14   
Likewise, in the absence of a common framework of social justice expressed in law, there 
are no principles available for assessing the claims of the dispossessed, and demands for 
international distributive justice invite a free-for-all.   
An international context presses on a weak point in liberal theories of social 
justice.    Rawls had argued in A Theory of Justice that a system of natural liberty unjust 
on the ground that, “it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by … 
factors … arbitrary from a moral point of view.”15 Charles Beitz applies Rawls’ 
argument to international affairs.  “If evidence of global economic and political 
interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we 
not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance.”
should 
y talents either.    
16   As 
Libertarians17 and Communitarians18 have both pointed out, however, it does not follow, 
from the premise, that I do not deserve my talents and the social circumstances (such as 
being born in a rich country) that enable me to develop them, that any other human being 
or group can claim m
The later Rawls rejects any deduction of principles of justice from universal and 
necessary premises, while attempting to apply the notion of reasonable pluralism to a 
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wider variety of outlooks.  When Rawls defines the original position from which he 
derives the law of peoples, he assumes that the parties are “citizens of some liberal 
democratic society, though not the same one” and “know that reasonably favorable 
conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible.”19   His theory is, like the 
World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, a vehicle by which rich 
countries impose terms on poor ones – perhaps acceptable as a modus vivendi, but hardly 
an imperious requirement of justice.    
Rawls’ critics ‘from the left’ argue that what he describes as failure to provide aid 
is in fact harming.20  In evaluating this claim, everything depends on our background 
picture of politics outside a particular civil society.  If we view human history as largely 
one of predation, and moments of generosity and concern for injustices done others as 
exceptional, we will reach different understandings of present practice than if we regard 
the West as violating a paradise inhabited by noble savages.  Moreover, any of the people 
who claim compensation for past injuries would not exist, as cultural and biological 
entities, but for these injuries; hence questions of transgenerational justice raises difficult 
metaphysical issues.  Finally, the dangers of imperialism latent in demands for economic 
justice are serious in a world in which people in poor countries desire to maintain their 
independence while reaping the benefits of modernity.   Martha Nussbaum has made it 
clear in many writings that she is prepared to subject the familial and communal life of 
men and women everywhere to invasive principles of abstract justice. 21    
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Diversity 
Religion and secular ideology are divisive even domestically.    In the 
international arena, they are more varied in character, and the constraining institutions are 
weaker.   Hence the culture wars are now international.   Many human rights advocates 
have a hard time seeing that, for pro-life people, opposition to abortion is a human rights 
cause quite as much as opposition to arbitrary imprisonment. 22  The fact of human 
diversity includes, not only such ground-level moral controversies, but also completing 
understandings of the nature of law and its social role. 23   
Different institutions are appropriate to peoples with different circumstances and 
histories, and peoples whose ways of life have been destroyed succumb to anomie, a 
condition that can be recognized as bad from a number of different normative 
perspectives.  Moreover, non-Western ways of life might realize goods that consumer 
capitalism neglects.  Imposing even good institutions on an alien society may fail in 
practice and in any case entail serious costs. 24   Nonetheless, just as there are individual 
decisions we regard as criminal, there are ways of life that are outside the pale.  How we 
are to judge which these are is, however, a difficult issue.  For these reasons, there is little 
language in which the common problems of humanity can be discussed. 
 
The Core Paradox  
International law rests on State practice, though it also stands in judgment over 
such practice.    States persistently escape, one way or another, apparent international 
legal obligations that infringe their ‘vital’ interests, however implausible to external 
observers some of these claims of vital interest might be.25  Hence we get either 
 8
restatements of State practice, which is then legal by definition, or ideals that in theory 
stand in judgment on State practice, but in practice can be manipulated to support 
whatever some government wants to do. 
Finnish jurist Martti Koskenniemi explains the result for the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity.  
Neither of the conflicting principles can be preferred because they are ultimately 
the same.  When a people call for territorial integrity, they call for respect for their 
identity as a self-determining entity and vice-versa. In order to solve the conflict, 
one should need an external principle about which types of human association 
entail this respect and which do not.26  
To ask “whether to grant or reject or demand for self-determination … would move the 
situation closer to goal values of human dignity” (as Chen puts it with Taiwan in mind)27 
is to ask whether it is a good thing, on the whole, that an internationally ambiguous entity 
should gain recognition as a State.     
In short, international law is subject to three sources of paradox:  first, it takes 
fictional more seriously than natural persons; second, it attempts to derive norms from the 
anarchic practice of such artificial persons; third, when, despite its bias in favor of States, 
it affirms the dignity and inviobility of natural persons, it lacks resources for defending 
the claim that we have such dignity or finding out what it implies.   The root of these 
paradoxes lies in the fact that – even when it talks individual rights and responsibilities or 
recognizes entities other than traditional States – international law is concerned group 
rather than individual conflict – in terms of crime with genocide rather than murder.28 
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NATURAL LAW AND REALISM 
International law cannot rest on agreement alone.  For treaties, including the UN 
Charter, require on a prior norm requiring their observance.   The foundation of 
international law consists in two elements unequally yoked together – one linked to the 
sovereignty of the nation-state and one founded on the supra-conventional principle that 
States at least should be held to the standards they invoke against others.   
Realists hold that moral discourse is out of place in international politics:  
arbitration is possible when both parties have the capacity to do one another serious 
damage; when they are unequal, the weak must accept whatever terms the strong might 
impose.  There is now no way of limiting realism to international contexts.  Most of us 
cannot live with a doctrine according to which the only thing wrong with Hitler’s regime 
is that he lost.   And the intuitions that oppose realism have a realistic basis.  For power 
relations are unstable, and asymmetric conflicts sometimes end with the victory of the 
weaker party.   And, whoever wins at the end of the day, weaker parties can inflict 
enough damage to require the stronger party to take them seriously.  Even the most 
powerful members of the world’s most powerful society can be at the World Trade 
Center on 11 September 2001.   
The claims of common humanity, and the need for co-operation across national 
borders, are urgent.    Cassese suggests a hopeful middle way (though one that needs to 
be updated) when he argues that, for a norm to bind a State in the absence of its explicit 
consent, the most important and representative States of the various blocs agree to it. 29  
The following principles of practical reasonableness – Seek peace and keep it, Keep your 
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promises, Recognize other human beings as human, Recognize their right to be choose 
what we would not, Practice what you preach, See yourself as others see you, and Accept 
imperfect solutions – form a sound though incomplete morality.   
Terrorism is a radical refusal to recognize the humanity of people who are 
somehow other and hence a grave violation of international law and morality.   Terrorists, 
however, like Allied terror bombers during the Second World War, can always plead 
‘supreme emergency,’ and the West is hard pressed to repudiate the premise, 30 especially 
when such emergency is now invoked to defend torture.31     
Still, we dare not repudiate secular justice or human law, however inadequate they 
may be.   Appeals to self-interest can only support hypocrisy, as the tribute vice pays to 
virtue, and a life of consistent hypocrisy, as Plato urged long ago, dooms a person to 
perpetual sickness of soul.    
International law, like all law, serves as a moral educator.  But, unlike Mother 
Teresa, the law must deal with open, persistent violators of its precepts or lose its 
authority.     Law is a compromise between justice and power: 32 its point is to introduce 
some elements of justice, however limited, into a system of power relations that without 
it would be intolerable.  Respecting the finitude of human justice is itself a requirement of 
justice.33   Any system of law requires some authority capable of making the required 
judgments of prudence; at present what have is an ill defined something called 
‘international public opinion.’   
In the absence of politically legitimate appeals to a divine legislator, international 
law is a postulate in Kant’s sense, as is the human community that is its source.  The 
same is true of the sovereign state and its laws.    If people are prepared limitlessly to 
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indulge in injustice and hypocrisy for the sake of fleshy satisfactions, or press the claims 
of justice, as they understand it, until they destroy any possible society, practical 
argument comes to an end. 34  
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 NOTES 
 
1 The United States, for example, has invoked international law against Iran, but 
exempted itself from its requirements with respect to Nicaragua.   
 2 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), arts. 53, 64,and 66,  
3 Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 
2000):  62.   This statement provoked protests when she was granted an honorary degree 
at Jesuit sponsored Boston College, on the grounds that it was contrary to the Catholic 
doctrine of the unity of the human family.  “Condolezza Rice Does Not Deserve a Boston 
College Honorary Degree,” 4 May 2006, 
http://michaelmoore.com/mustread/index.php?id=641; accessed 22 June 2006. 
4 Morgenthau was in part motivated by fears of moral imperialism. See his In Defense of 
the National Interest (New York:  Knopf , 1952) and Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New York:  Knopf, 1985) 
5 Rice, “National Interest,” p. 49. 
6 On this development, see Chris Brown, “International Affairs,” in Robert E. Goodin and 
Philip Pettit, eds., A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 1993), chap.  27. For a compendium of the sorts of interactions that 
undermine the state-centered model, see Joseph S. Nye, “Transnational and 
Transgovernmental Relations,” in Geoffrey Goodwin and Andrew Linklater, eds., New 
Dimensions in World Politics (New York:  Wiley, 1975), chap. 2. 
7 Norman Podhoretz has written of the “incandescent moral clarity” and “lovely condition 
of the spirit” attained by demands for unconditional surrender, in other words by denying 
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outsiders any standing in the forum of justice.  “In Praise of the Bush Doctrine,” 
Commentary  (September 2002); and  “Syria Yes, Israel, No?” Weekly Standard (19 
November 2001).  Both quotations were found in Andrew J. Bacevich, The New 
American Militarism (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005), p.  95. Podhoretz’ son 
John drops the other shoe:  “Wasn’t the survival of Sunni men between the ages of 15 
and 35 the reason why there was an insurgency [in Iraq] and the basic cause of the 
sectarian violence now?”  John Podhoretz, “Too Nice to Win?  Israel’s Dilemma,” New 
York Post On-line, 25 July 2006. 
8 See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1983), chap. 9, esp. pp. 224-232. 
9 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986). p. 291. 
10 Geoffrey Robertson, QC, Crimes Against Humanity, rev. ed. (New York:  New Press, 
2002), p.  326. 
11 Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law, 2nd edition (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 2000), p. xii. 
12 Declaration Against Torture (1975) and Torture Convention (1984), as cited in 
Robertson, Crimes, pp. 247-48. 
13On one occasion, “a trial chamber [of the Hague Tribunal for former Yugoslavia] 
seemed to argue that every rape of a woman  (although, curiously, not of a man) was by 
definition torture, irrespective of motive”  (Ibid,, p. 326, citing The Celbići Case 
(Prosecutor v. Zejnal Delaćic and others) (16 November 1996), ¶ 476.)  This otherwise 
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bizarre judgment makes sense if we regard rape not as a crime against the individual 
woman, but as an attack on a community through its women. 
14 Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2004), p. 190. 
15 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1972), 
p. 72 . 
16Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p 152. 
17 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, n.d.), pp. 
213ff. 
18 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp. 96-103. 
19Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.  
32n1 and 33. 
20 See for example, Thomas Pogge, “A Cosmopolitan Perspective on the Global 
Economic Order,” in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, eds., The Political Philosophy 
of Cosmopolitanism  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
21 Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract,” ibid., , chap. 13;  “Love, Care and Women’s 
Dignity,” in Philip Alperson, ed., Diversity and Community (Malden, Mass.:  Blackwell, 
2002). 
22 See the remarks on Lech Walesa in Robertson, Crimes, p. 523. 
23 See, for example, P. S. Atiyah and R S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-
American Law (Oxford:  Clarendon, 2002), discussing two legal systems that are in some 
respects similar. 
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24 See Bilihari Kaukisan, “Asian versus ‘Universal’ Human Rights,” and Aryeh Neier, 
“Asia’s Unacceptable Standard,” Responsive Community 7 no. 3 (summer 1997):  9-30, 
for an illuminating discussion of the resulting issues.  
25 Sir Adrian Roberts, “Just Peace: A Cause Worth Fighting For,” in Pierre Allan and 
Alexis Keller, eds., What is a Just Peace? (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 
83, lists China, India, and Russia, as well as the USA as rejecting important parts of the 
international legal order 
26 Koshennimi, “The Politics of International Law,” European Journal of International 
Law 1 (1990), reprinted in Keith C. Culver, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Law 
(Ontario, CANADA:  Broadview, 1999), pp. 519-20. 
27 Chen, Introduction, p. 35. 
28 Because Pol Pot killed mainly fellow Khmer, the international community did not unite 
in regarding him as guilty of genocide.    See Lori Fischler Damroch, “Genocide and 
Ethnic Conflict,” in David Wippman, ed., International Law and Ethnic Conflict  (Ithaca, 
N.Y.:  Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 10. 
29Cassese, International Law, p. 179. 
30 For a defense of Allied terror bombing, see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York:  
Basic, 1977), chap. 16, reiterated in his Arguing, chap. 3.  “Supreme emergency,” Walzer 
maintains, “… rests on the existence of a collective entity – religious, political, or cultural 
– that the individuals compose and from which they derive some portion of their 
character, practices, and beliefs” (ibid.,  p. 42, citing Burke at pp.  42-43).  Muslims 
employing terror tactics could make exactly this argument. 
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31 On the current debate see, Karen J. Greenberg, ed., The Torture Debate in America 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006), and in Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: 
A Collection (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004). 
32 This is not a definition of law but a description, consistent with any definition (for 
example that of St. Thomas Aquinas) that acknowledges positivistic, natural law, and 
realistic elements. 
33This sentence is directed against “Operation Infinite Justice,” the official name of the 
American invasion of Afghanistan before Islamic – for some reason not Jewish or 
Christian – objections intervened.   For a selection of perspectives, see "Infinite Justice, 
out – Enduring Freedom, in," BBC News (25 September 2001); Matt Bivens, “Pentagon 
PR in Search of Perfect Name," The Moscow Times.Com (24 September 2001); 
Arundhati Roy, "The Algebra of Infinite Justice," Guardian Unlimited (29 September 
2001). 
34 Thanks to Josef Velazquez, and to the participants in a Philosophy Department seminar 
held at Providence College in November 2006, especially Michael O’Neill and Matthew 
Cuddeback, for their discussion of the issues considered in this essay; and to Vance 
Morgan for arranging this seminar.   Thanks as well to the audience at my presentation at 
Notre Dame. 
